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Abstract
Using data on Italian cities, we document that, over the period 2001 – 2011, the
number of establishments and employment in some key service industries are positively
related to the inflow of tourists. We then build a general equilibrium model of small
open cities to study the impact of tourism on endogenous amenities, factors’ allocation
across sectors, prices, and welfare. Tourism has two main effects on the urban econ-
omy: first, consistently with the observed pattern in the data, it increases the number
of firms (an endogenous consumption amenity) and employment in the non-tradable
sector; second, it increases prices. In the model tourism may hurt the resident popu-
lation: with unequal land endowments, poorer residents are hurt by tourism because
the rise in city prices offsets the positive impact on the urban consumption amenity.
Along with several other extensions to the baseline model, we study the interplay
of historical (exogenous) amenities, tourism and residents welfare in a system of two
cities.
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Non-tecnical summary
In this paper, we provide a general framework to study the impact of tourism on a
city. Tourism is a debated issue in many cities, especially in Europe: on the one hand, it
is generally seen as beneficial for urban growth and development; on the other hand, as
tourist inflows rise, cities are also experiencing rising rents and consumption prices, as well
as increased congestion (such as noise, traffic, etc.).
As a motivation to our analysis, we document some empirical correlations using data on
Italian cities, over the time period 2001 – 2011. We show that the number of restaurants
and bars, as well as the number of retail stores, has increased more in municipalities that
received a higher inflow of tourists. The same pattern holds for the level of employment in
the same industries. These industries are closely related to urban consumption amenities,
that are thought to be key for economic success (Glaeser et al., 2008).
In our model, consumer’s welfare depends on two components: consumption amenities
and real income. Consumption amenities come in the form of product variety in the services
sector. Furthermore, residents are at the same time wage earners on the labor market, land
owners, and consumers. Tourism exerts an upward demand pressure on the land market, on
the labor market, and on the market for services. Therefore, tourism has an impact both
on consumption amenities and on the real income of residents.
Our analysis delivers a number of key findings. First, as tourist inflows rise, the share
of residents employed in services increases. At high levels of tourism, cities fully specialize
in the services sector. Second, we find that tourism always increases the aggregate welfare
of residents. If land is equally distributed among residents, this also implies that tourism
increases welfare for all residents. This outcome is the sum of two forces: first, consumption
amenities increase; second, real incomes increase because of higher rents. As a third result,
we find that, when land is unequally distributed, tourism harms poorer residents, unless
consumption amenities are strong enough to compensate this effect.
Finally, we study the distribution of tourists between two alternative destinations. When
consumption amenities are weak, tourists visit both cities in equilibrium. In this case, the
share of tourists in a city is increasing with the level of historical amenities, services TFP,
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land stock, and resident population. When consumption amenities are strong, a “tourist
hub” emerges, as the rich variety of services attracts all tourists in one of the two cities.
3
1 Introduction
Tourism is increasingly seen as one of the main drivers of urban growth and wealth. For
instance, Carlino and Saiz (2008) show that the number of leisure visits to a city is one of
the key predictors of its economic success. However, as tourist inflows rise, many cities are
also experiencing rising land and consumption prices and congestion. Moreover, the costs
and benefits of tourism may be shared unequally by the resident population, which is a key
issue when evaluating the welfare impact of local policies aimed at boosting the tourism
sector. In fact, these issues are currently being debated in many cities, especially in Europe;
prominent examples include Venice and Barcelona, where concerns against rising rents and
congestion led groups of residents to organize street protests and awareness campaigns.1
In this paper, we study how tourism affects cities through the lens of urban economics.
Using data on Italian cities, we first document that, over the period 2001 – 2011, the
number of establishments and the level of employment in services are positively related
to the inflow of tourists. To address these patterns, we build a model with endogenous
consumption amenities, price and real income effects, and two sectors of production (a
tradable intermediate sector and a non-tradable services sector).
Consumption amenities come in the form of product variety in the services sector, where
horizontally differentiated firms engage in monopolistic competition. These firms are retail
shops, restaurants, and other economic activities connected to a thriving service sector. Real
income effects arise because residents are at the same time wage earners, land owners and
consumers, and wages, land prices and consumption prices are determined endogenously
through market clearing. Tourism exerts an upward demand pressure on the land mar-
ket, on the labour market, and on the market for the non-tradable good, inducing general
equilibrium effects on all these variables.
Furthermore, when tourists are mobile across alternative destinations, spatial equilib-
rium effects arise. We characterize the spatial equilibrium in a simple Rosen-Roback setting
1Similar protests also occurred in Rome, Amsterdam, Dubrovnik - see, for instance, First Venice and
Barcelona: now anti-tourism marches spread across Europe, (The Guardian, August 10th, 2017), and How
much tourism is too much?, (The New York Times, June 29th, 2017).
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with two cities. However, we depart from the classic framework (see Rosen, 1979; Roback,
1982) in that, in our model, the resident population is fixed, and there is a second class of
agents, i.e. tourists, who are mobile across cities.2
Our paper addresses some important issues about the impact of tourism in an urban
setting. The first concerns the way tourism changes the sectoral composition of the local
economy. We find that, as the number of tourists increases, the city undergoes a structural
transformation away from the tradable sector, and specializes in non-tradables - where,
recall, the non-tradable sector is the source of consumption amenities. The pattern of
urban specialization shapes the welfare impact of tourism on residents, and here we come
to the second contribution of our analysis. We show that the aggregate welfare impact of
tourism is always positive; however, in the partial specialization scenario which, as we show,
is empirically more relevant we find that tourism has important distributional effects: our
model predicts that poorer residents lose from increased tourism, whereas richer residents
gain. Finally, as a third contribution, our analysis characterizes precisely the relationship
between consumption amenities and the spatial equilibrium across cities. We show that when
consumption amenities are strong, tourists are attracted to tourism-crowded cities, because
as the number of tourists goes up and the service sector thrives, consumption amenities
strengthen, and this, in turn, attracts even more tourists. In a system of two (or more)
cities, this gives rise to a tourist hub, where, by this expression, we mean a situation where
all tourists are concentrated in a single city. In contrast, when consumption amenities are
weak, tourists are spread over different cities provided that an interior equilibrium exists,
and in this case we study the interplay between a city’s attractiveness in terms of historical
or natural (exogenous) amenities and residents welfare.
Our paper is related to two main strands of literature. First, we contribute to the
economic literature on urban amenities. Glaeser et al. (2001), who introduced the concept
of “consumer city”, argue that two types of amenities are particularly important for urban
2While the assumption that residents are immobile is restrictive, it also grants us one important advan-
tage: it allows to study the consequences of unequal land endowments for the welfare of residents, sparing
us the trouble to make assumptions on how the land endowment is disposed of when the resident relocates
to another city.
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success. On the one side, cities offer a rich variety of services and non-tradable consumer
goods; on the other side, all attributes related to the aesthetics and the physical setting play
an important role, since they are increasingly valued by consumers. In our terminology, the
former falls in the category of endogenous amenities, whereas the latter falls in the category
of exogenous amenities. Our paper builds on the importance of amenities for urban success,
and presents an integrated framework to study how tourism affects urban amenities and real
incomes, the implications for the welfare of residents, and how endogenous and exogenous
amenities interact at the urban level. On the empirical side, there is a number of papers
that study the link between the composition of local demand and product diversity. For
instance, Waldfogel (2008) finds that the demographic mix of the population (i.e. ethnicity,
income, education) affects the type of available restaurants across U.S. ZIP codes. Mazzolari
and Newmark (2007) also find that the share of immigrants is related to the share of ethnic
restaurants across Census tracts in California. Finally, Schiff (2015) finds that larger and
denser markets offer both greater variety and rarer varieties of restaurants. Consistently with
this literature, we document that in our data tourism and the number of restaurants and
retail shops are correlated across Italian cities. Our theoretical findings are also consistent
with Carlino and Saiz (2008), who show that the number of leisure visits to a city provides
a good revealed-preference measure of local leisure amenities. Finally, in Lee (2010) land
prices and consumption amenities shape the sorting pattern of high-skilled and low-skilled
workers across cities, thus contributing to explain the urban wage premium. In our model,
these same forces determine the set of residents who gain or lose from tourism, when we
allow them to differ in terms of land endowments.
A second strand of literature that is related to our paper is the one about the impact
of tourism on a local economy. Our baseline results are related to Copeland (1991), who
studies a small open economy and presents two main findings: first, the welfare impact of
tourism is positive, as long as it increases the relative price of non-tradables; second, under
certain conditions tourism can lead to a contraction of the manufacturing sector in favour
of the non-tradable sector. Chao et al. (2006) provide a similar analysis in the context
of a dynamic macro model. In a recent paper, Faber and Gaubert (2017) find a positive
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welfare impact of tourism on the Mexican economy, using a structural spatial framework
that includes productivity spillovers between the services and the manufacturing sector. We
cast the discussion about the impact of tourism in an urban context that features historical
amenities, consumption amenities, and unequal land endowments among residents.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some empirical
patterns that we aim to replicate in in the model. Section 3 presents the baseline model. In
section 4 we derive the key results concerning the welfare effects of tourism in the presence
of an unequal land distribution among residents. In section 5 we generalize the model to a
system of two cities. We then present in section 6 some further extensions to our setting.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical patterns
In this section, we document the empirical association between tourism and some key eco-
nomic variables across Italian municipalities, over the time period 2001 – 2011. Although
these patterns should not be interpreted as causal effects, they provide motivation for the
theoretical analysis that we develop in the following sections. At the same time, we ground
our specifications in the functional forms that we derive from the model. We focus on the
number of establishments and sectoral employment at the city level.
Our data come from two main sources. First, we use Italian Census data for years
2001 and 2011. The Industry and Services Census provides information on the number of
establishments and the number of employees in each sector for all Italian municipalities,
with sectors defined following the NACE classification. We complement this data set with
the total resident population from the Population Census. Second, data on tourism activity
come from the Annual Survey of the Capacity of Tourist Accommodation Establishments,
conducted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat). This survey provides the
number of overnight stays at the province level,3 and the number of beds (a measure of
capacity) at the municipality level. First, we allocate the number of overnight stays to each
3The province level corresponds to NUTS 3 in terms of the European geographical classification.
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municipality proportionally to its relative within-province capacity. Second, in order to
provide a measure of tourism in resident-equivalent terms, we divide the number of overnight
stays by 365 (assuming that each resident spends 365 nights in his place of residence). Then,
we construct our main explanatory variable as the number of tourists per 1000 residents at
the municipality level.4
The basic specification we run is
∆yij = α + δ1∆tourismij + δ2xij + µj + ǫij ,
where: ∆yij is the absolute change in the dependent variable of interest from 2001 to
2011 in municipality i within province j; ∆tourismij is the main explanatory variable, the
absolute change in the number of resident-equivalent tourists per 1000 residents from 2001
to 2011 in municipality i in province j; xij is a set of controls, including total municipal
land area, average elevation, and a dummy for coastal towns; µj is a set of 103 dummies,
one for each province; ǫij is the error term. Note that first differences control for all time-
invariant factors that affect the level of yij at the municipality level; moreover, province
dummies ensure that our variation comes from comparing municipalities within narrow and
homogenous spatial units. We trim our data set in order to exclude municipalities with
extremely low or high values for our main regressor ∆tourismij.
5 The resulting empirical
density function is depicted in figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis, for
our base year (2001) and for the change over the subsequent decade (2001-2011). A first
observation that emerges from the table is that the spatial distribution of tourism is uneven.
In 2001, on average, there were 19 tourists per 1000 residents in Italian municipalities,
whereas the median was 1.5, and the 75th percentile was 8.4. Therefore, most municipalities
host a small number of tourists, while a few municipalities host a large number of tourists.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
4More information on the data used is provided in the Appendix.
5We drop municipalities belonging to the top 1% and bottom 1% of the distribution.
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Second, the number of tourists over 1000 residents increased (by 1.7 units) over our
period of study; however, as shown in figure 2, this number masks a steep decline for the
top 10% destinations (as of 2001), and a mild increase along the rest of the distribution,
especially for the 8th and 9th deciles. For this reason, we run our main regressions both on
the full sample and excluding the top-decile municipalities. Moreover, the number of hotels
per 1000 residents and the number of restaurants and bars per 1000 residents increased,
whereas the number of retail stores per 1000 residents decreased. A similar pattern emerges
in terms of employment (the average change in employment in retail stores is small and
positive, while the corresponding median change is small and negative).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In table 2 we report the results on tourism and the number of establishments for the
different industries in our sample. We report in panel A the correlation between the change
in the number of tourists per 1000 residents from 2001 to 2011 and the change in the
number of establishments per 1000 residents over the same time period for the full sample
of municipalities. We focus on industries that, in our view, represent important urban
consumption amenities, both for residents and tourists: restaurants and bars (column 2),
and different types of retail trade stores (columns 3-8); in the last column, we also report
results for the tourist accommodation sector. The coefficients reported show that tourism
is positively associated with the number of restaurants and bars, and with the total number
of retail shops. For instance, in the case of Venice, back-of-the-envelope calculations show
that the increase in restaurant and bars in the 2001-2011 period that can be related to the
inflow of tourists is roughly equal to 80 establishments. Census data show that the total
increase of business units in industry 56 over the same period of time amounts to 374. For
Florence, which experienced a much lower increase in tourism, we estimate an increase of
14 restaurant and bars related to the tourists inflow, while the overall increase coming out
from Census data totals 425 business units. In columns 4-8, we break down the 2-digit retail
shops sector into its main 3-digit subsectors.6 There is a positive and significant correlation
6We exclude from the analysis gas stations, ICT retail shops, retail sale via mail orders or via Internet,
and second-hand market sales.
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for specialized food shops, books, sport, toys and clothing and footwear. As expected, the
number of accommodation establishments is also positively related to the change in the
number of tourists.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Panels B and C of table 2 check the robustness of these correlations. In panel B we
show the results of the same regression, excluding the municipalities in the top decile of
the tourists distribution in 2001. Results are broadly consistent. In panel C, as a second
robustness check, we exclude municipalities with zero tourist density in either 2001, or 2011,
or both years. Again, results are consistent, except in the regression on the number of food
and beverages stores, where the coefficient is now insignificant.
How can we interpret the heterogeneity across industries? For example, why does tourism
correlate with the number of specialized food shops but not with the number of non-
specialized stores? And why is the coefficient on clothing and footwear higher than the
coefficient on books, sport, and toys? Our model provides two different answers. First, as
we show in section 3, the coefficient linking the number of establishments to the tourist
flow should be smaller when economies of scale are large; second, as we discuss in section
6.2, the coefficient should be higher in those industries that are more represented in tourist
expenditure.
In table 3 we replicate table 2, using as a dependent variable the change in city employ-
ment between 2001 and 2011, normalized by the resident population, for the same set of
industries. The correlation is positive for restaurant and bars, and for the total number of
employees in retail stores, confirming that municipalities that experienced stronger tourism
inflows also specialized more towards the sectors producing urban consumption amenities.
The effect is statistically significant for the books, sport, toys, and clothing and footwear
industries.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
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3 The baseline model
The city consists of a fixed resident population, nR, and a fixed amount of land, H , which is
used both for residential and for commercial purposes. Each resident supplies inelastically
one unit of labour, so that the labour force is also equal to nR. The number of tourists
visiting the city is nT . In the next sections, we take nT as exogenously given. In section 5,
we study how nT is endogenously determined in a two-city system, given a total exogenous
number of tourists NT .
3.1 Preferences
Both residents (i = R) and tourists (i = T ) have a Cobb-Douglas utility function defined
over a bundle of non-tradable services and land:
Ui = Ai
(
Ci
γ
)γ (
hi
1− γ
)1−γ
, 0 < γ < 1,
where Ai is the exogenous amenity level provided by the city, Ci is a bundle of differentiated
non-tradable services, hi is land consumption, and γ is the share of income allocated to non-
tradable service consumption. As in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation, we assume that
Ci is a CES aggregate of a continuum of differentiated varieties:
Ci =
(∫ m
0
cεijdj
) 1
ε
, 0 < ε < 1,
where ε is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties and m is the mass (here-
after, number) of varieties supplied by the non-tradable sector. Since our focus is on the
mobility of tourists, we set AR = 1 and leave only AT to matter in the rest of the analy-
sis. AT is an index broadly interpreted as those exogenous features of a city (monuments,
museums, parks, etc.) that attract tourists. Let us call them historical amenities, with
the understanding that this term may also include natural amenities. We model historical
amenities as a preference shifter: a higher AT increases the marginal utility of consump-
tion in a given city. The number of varieties of the services sector plays in our setting the
role of a consumption amenity. In fact, as is well known, under Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
consumers’ welfare is increasing in the number of differentiated varieties supplied by the
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market. We think of m as the number of restaurants, retail shops, and other activities
connected with a thriving service sector. This number makes a city more or less attractive,
and is endogenously determined. In our model, consistently with the empirical patterns we
have documented, this number is related to the number of tourists visiting the city.
Some comments are in order. First, we assume that residents and tourists consume the
same goods.7 Second, we assume that residents and tourists devote the same share of their
budget to land consumption. Third, assuming that all tourists consume land, we neglect
the role of day-trippers.
Residents and tourists maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, which is given
by:
∫ m
0
psjcijdj + qhi ≤ Ii =

w + q H
nR
for i = R
IT for i = T
where psj is the price of one unit of non-tradable services purchased from firm j, w is the
wage rate, q is the price of one unit of land, H/nR is the land wealth of a resident, and IT
is the exogenous tourist income, which we assume to be the same for all tourists.8 In our
model there is a unique labour market with perfectly mobile workers, and consequently the
equilibrium wage rate is unique. Taking the first-order conditions, individual demands are
given by:
cij = p
−
1
1−ε
sj P
ε
1−ε
s γIi, j = 1...m,
hi = (1− γ)
Ii
q
,
(1)
where Ps is the price index in the non-tradable sector, Ps =
(∫ m
0
p
−ε
1−ε
i di
)
−
1−ε
ε
. As far as the
price of each non-tradable service variety is the same (something that is true at equilibrium)
7In section 6.2, we consider the opposite assumption where residents and tourists consume different
goods.
8Given homothetic preferences, the solution of the model only depends on aggregate expenditure, so this
assumption entails no loss of generality.
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the indirect utilities of residents and tourists are:
VR =m
γ(1−ε)
ε
w + q H
nR
pγsq1−γ
, (2)
VT =ATm
γ(1−ε)
ε
IT
pγsq1−γ
, (3)
where ps is the equilibrium price of differentiated varieties. We can see from these equations
that welfare positively depends on two components: first, on the number m of non-tradable
services varieties, due to the love of variety effect ; second, it depends on real incomes, since
nominal incomes IR and IT are deflated by the price index p
γ
sq
1−γ. In equilibrium, the
number of tourists will influence welfare through both channels. Moreover, note that the
nominal income of residents, IR = w + q
H
nR
, is endogenous, as it depends on wages and
land prices. Instead, tourist nominal income IT is fixed; however, in equilibrium tourist real
income does respond to the number of tourists via its effect on prices.
Finally, aggregate demand for non-tradable variety j is given by:
nRcR,j + nT cT,j = p
−
1
1−ǫ
js Ps
ε
1−εγ(wnR + qH + nT IT ). (4)
Firms, in the services sector, take into account this relationship when maximizing their
profits.
3.2 Production
In the city there are two sectors: a differentiated non-tradable sector (non-tradable services)
and a homogenous intermediate sector, whose output is used in the production of non-
tradable services and freely traded on world markets. We choose the homogenous good as
the numeraire of the economy.
The non-tradable sector, indexed by s, is characterized by monopolistic competition.
Each variety j is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function that combines
labour, land, and the intermediate input under constant returns to scale. Therefore, output
for each variety is equal to
ysj = asl
αs
sj h
βs
sj y
1−αs−βs
kj ,
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where as is the TFP in the non-tradable sector common to all firms, lsj is laborr, hsj is
land, and ykj is the quantity of intermediate input employed by firm j. The Cobb-Douglas
coefficients sum up to 1. To enter the non-tradable sector, firms need a fixed requirement of
η units of the intermediate input. In equilibrium, each firm will choose a different product
variety, so that the number of firms is equal to m. Profit maximization, subject to (4),
yields:
εαspsj
ysj
lsj
= w,
εβspsj
ysj
hsj
= q,
ε(1− αs − βs)psj
ysj
ykj
= 1.
(5)
Furthermore, free entry into the non-tradable sector ensures that in equilibrium all firms
make zero profits:
πsj = psjysj − wlsj − qhsj − ykj − η = 0. (6)
Clearly, given that all non-tradable firms share the same production function with the
same TFP, they will charge the same price in equilibrium, psj = ps for all j = 1, ..., m, and
demand the same amount of production factors. Manipulating conditions in (5) we get that
ps =
wαsqβs
εκsas
,
where κs < 1 is a constant.
9 From now on we drop subscript j. Aggregate labor demand in
sector s is then given by Ls =
∫ m
0
lsjdj = mls. Aggregate land demand (Hs) and intermediate
input demand (Yk) can be expressed in a similar way.
The intermediate sector, indexed by k, operates under constant returns to scale and uses
labor only. The production function is Y ok = akLk, where ak is the TFP in the intermediate
sector. Under our assumption of a single labor market, with workers freely mobile between
sectors, and as long as Lk > 0, the wage rate is fixed and equal to the marginal revenue in
the intermediate sector10:
w = ak. (7)
9See appendix 8.3.1
10If the intermediate sector also used land, this result would not hold, and we could not solve the model
in closed form.
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3.3 Equilibrium
There are four markets in our model: non-tradable services, land, labor, and the interme-
diate input. Equilibrium in each market requires:
nRcR + nT cT = ys (non-tradable market) (8)
nRhR + nThT +mhs = H (land market) (9)
mls + Lk = nR (labour market) (10)
m(yk + η) = Y
o
k +X (intermediate input) (11)
where X are net aggregate imports of the intermediate input. In the market clearing condi-
tions, we use the property of firm symmetry in the non-tradable sector. Equations (1), (5),
(7), (12), and (8)-(11), characterize the general equilibrium in the city.
Market clearing and the zero-profit condition in the non-tradable sector imply:
nT IT = X.
This equation is important because it represents a current account balance condition
between the city and the rest of the world. It says that tourist expenditure that flows into
the city has to be perfectly matched by payments on intermediate inputs that flow out of
the city, either due to net imports or total entry costs.
Our first result states that an expansion in tourism leads cities to specialize in the services
sector. To show this, let us derive an expression for the labour force employed in the services
sector s as a function of the number of tourists. First, optimal firm behavior in both sectors
allows us to write:
wLs = αsεpsYs
=
αs
1− αs − βs
Yk
=
αs
1− αs − βs
(Y ok +X −mη)
=
αs
1− αs − βs
(wLk + nT IT −mη),
where we have also used the market clearing condition (11) in the third equality, and the
current account balance condition in the fourth equality. Second, using the labour market
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clearing condition (10), we obtain:
wLs =
αs
1− βs
(wnR + nT IT −mη).
which depends on the wage rate and on the number of firms. Finally, we can write the zero
profit condition in sector s (12) in terms of wLs as
πs = 0 ⇐⇒
1− ε
ε
wLs
αs
= mη, (12)
and substitute it back into the previous expression to obtain
Ls
nR
=
αsε
1− βsε
(
1 +
nT IT
wnR
)
. (13)
As long as Lk > 0, so that w = ak, this expression pins down Ls as a function of nT . It
says that the labour force employed in the non-tradable sector is increasing in the number
of tourists who visit the city. Then, it is easy to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The share of the labor force employed in the services sector, Ls
nR
, is increas-
ing in the number of tourists in a city, nT .
When the number of tourists is greater than a threshold n̂T the city becomes fully specialized
in non-tradable services, that is, Ls
nR
= 1.
The economic intuition behind this result is simple, and, in general, it is related to the
economic literature on tourism and the Dutch disease - see, for instance, Copeland (1991),
Chao et al. (2006). Since services are not tradable, increased tourist demand pushes up
revenues in the non-tradable sector, whereas the price for the intermediate input is fixed on
world markets. Hence, the economy moves factors of production to the non-tradable sector
and substitutes the domestic production of the intermediate input with imports. Table 3,
in section 2, presents empirical evidence that is consistent with Proposition 1.
When the number of tourists is greater or equal than nˆT , the intermediate sector dis-
appears and the city economy becomes fully-specialized in the non-tradable sector. Setting
Ls = nR in (??), we can derive a closed-from expression for nˆT :
nˆT ≡
1− (αs + βs)ε
αsε
aknR
IT
.
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It is increasing in the productivity of the intermediate sector, ak, and in the resident pop-
ulation, nR. Therefore, larger cities, as well as cities where the intermediate sector is more
productive, can host a larger number of tourists before full specialization ensues.
To get a sense of the magnitude of this threshold, let us provide a simple parametrization.
Following the estimates of Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) for the services sector, we set
αs = 0.65 and βs = 0.2. Given there is no construction sector in our model, we include
both land and structures into the factor of production land. Also, we set the elasticity of
substitution between product varieties 1
1−ε
= 4, implying ε = 0.75. Given these values, the
share of tourists over the residents such that cities become fully specialized in services, nˆT
nR
,
is equal to a fraction 0.75 of ak
IT
, the ratio of local wages over tourist expenditure. Even
neglecting the fact that in reality tourist expenditure is higher than local wages, this cutoff
remains very high. Therefore, the model suggests that only under very special circumstances
should we observe full specialization in the service sector at the city level. In our sample of
Italian municipalities, in year 2001, the ratio nT
nR
has a mean of roughly 0.02, and exceeds
0.5 in about 90 municipalities, most of which are ski resorts in the Alps.
Let us now compute the equilibrium in our city. For nT ≥ nˆT , the city becomes fully
specialized in the production of non-tradable services. In this case, equation (13), with
Ls = nR, determines the equilibrium wage. We obtain:
w =

ak for nT < nˆT ,
κFw
nT IT
nR
for nT ≥ nˆT .
(14)
where κFw is a constant.
11 The wage rate is a continuous, non-decreasing function of nT with
a kink at nˆT .
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The reason is the following: as soon as the entire labor force is employed in the non-
tradable sector, the wage rate is no longer tied to the price of the intermediate input, that
is set on world markets; instead, it responds to local labor demand. Furthermore, given
11To index the constant terms, we use P for the partial specialisation scenario and F for the full special-
isation scenario.
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that labor supply is fixed at nR and production function is Cobb-Douglas, the wage rate
is proportional to aggregate demand in the non-tradable sector and, thus, to the number
of tourists nT . We now show that this kink is passed on to other economic variables: the
number of firms, prices, and welfare.12
Combining equations (12) and (13) with w = ak, the number of firms in the non-tradable
sector is:
m =

κPm
aknR+nT IT
η
for nT < nˆT ,
κFm
nT IT
η
for nT ≥ nˆT ,
(15)
with κPm < κ
F
m. To solve for the land price q, write qHs =
βs
αs
wLs and substitute this
expression, together with (13), into the market clearing condition for land (9). We get:
q =

κPq
aknR+nT IT
H
for nT < nˆT ,
κFq
nT IT
H
for nT ≥ nˆT
(16)
with κPq < κ
F
q . The expression for Hs follows immediately:
Hs =
βsεγ
1− γ + βsεγ
H.
Note that, due to the Cobb-Douglas assumption on both utility and production, the non-
tradable sector always employs a constant fraction of the city land, regardless of the number
of tourists in the city. Finally, we need to recover the price for non-tradable services, ps.
From the first order condition for the non-tradable sector, ps =
wαsqβs
εκsas
, plugging in w and q,
ps =

(κPq )
βs
εκs
aαs
k
as
(
aknR+nT IT
H
)βs
for nT < nˆT ,
(κFw)
αs (κFq )
βs
εκs
(nT IT )
αs+βs
asn
αs
R
Hβs
for nT ≥ nˆT .
(17)
Let us make some comments about the relationships we derived so far. First, note
that w, m, q and ps are all non-decreasing in the number of tourists, with a kink at nˆT .
12The Cobb-Douglas formulation implies that the elasticity of substitution between factors of production
is equal to one. In section 6.3, we extend the model to allow for a higher elasticity of substitution between
labor and the intermediate input. Intuitively, this raises the threshold nˆT and flattens the wage response
to tourism under full specialization.
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The variables m, q and ps are indeed strictly increasing in nT , but while the number of
firms and the land price have a steeper slope in the full specialisation scenario than under
partial specialisation, the slope can be steeper or flatter for the price of non-tradable services
depending on the size of the resident population, nR. Second, and more importantly, note
that whereas m and q are linear in the number of tourists, ps is a concave function. As we
will show, this result has important implications for the welfare impact of tourism. Finally,
as far as m is concerned, table 2 in section 2 presents empirical evidence that is consistent
with equation (15).
3.4 Welfare analysis
What is the impact of tourism on the welfare of residents? As we discussed earlier – see
equation (2) – the number of tourists affects the welfare of residents through two channels:
consumption amenities and real incomes. The effect on consumption amenities is always
positive - see equation (15): tourism boosts growth in services, increasing the number of
available varieties. In contrast, the sign of the real income effect is not obvious: as tourists
flow into the city, the resident population earns better wages and rents, but also faces higher
consumption prices. The following proposition characterizes the overall impact of tourism
on the welfare of residents.
Proposition 2. The welfare of residents, VR, is always increasing in the number of tourists,
nT .
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result is easier to understand in the full specialisation scenario. In this case, resident
nominal income, IR, is linear in the number of tourists, nT , as tourist expenditure causes a
proportional increase in wages w and land prices q. In contrast, the price index pγsq
1−γ is a
concave function of the number of tourists. The economic reason is that the marginal cost
in the non-tradable sector depends not only on w and q, but also on the tradable input,
whose price is fixed on the world market and therefore does not react to tourism inflows.
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The net effect on resident real income is positive, because the numerator grows more than
the denominator. The increasing number of varieties further reinforces this positive effect.
Although the intuition is similar, things are more subtle in the partial specialization
scenario. In this case, resident wages are also fixed, so that the impact of tourism runs
through land prices only. The effect of tourism on real land income is always positive:
nominal land income rises linearly with the number of tourists, whereas the price index
pγsq
1−γ is concave. In this case the effect of tourism on real wages is always negative, but
the positive real land income and consumption amenity effects prevail. Therefore, also in
the partial specialization case, the total welfare effect of tourism on residents is positive.
As far as real income is concerned, proposition 2 is related to the result in Copeland
(1991), that tourism improves welfare as long as it increases the price of non-tradables.
However, our model also features monopolistic competition in the service sector; thus, it
allows to shed light on endogenous consumption amenities and to study their importance
for welfare in conjunction with real income effects.
Let us now turn to the welfare of tourists. Again, the effect going through consumption
amenities is always positive. In contrast, the real income effect is always negative, as tourist
nominal income is fixed at IT and doesn’t adjust to the tourism-related hike in prices. Which
of the two effects prevails? The following proposition shows that tourists are better off in
tourism-crowded cities as long as the non-tradable sector is sufficiently differentiated.
Proposition 3. Under partial specialisation, nT < nˆT , the welfare of tourists, VT , is in-
creasing in the number of tourists, nT , if and only if
ε <
γ
1 + βsγ
≡ εˆP .
Under full specialisation, nT ≥ nˆT , the welfare of tourists, VT , is increasing in the number
of tourists, nT , if and only if
ε <
γ
1 + γ(αs + βs)
≡ εˆF ,
with εˆF < εˆP .
Proof. See the Appendix.
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The economic intuition behind this result is simple. When the elasticity of substitution
in the non-tradable sector, ε, is sufficiently high, the gains from variety are low and the
negative real income effect prevails. In this case, the impact of tourism on the welfare of
tourists is negative. However, provided that ε is sufficiently low, the gains from variety
overcome the real income losses, and an increase in the number of tourists, nT , brings a
positive effect on the welfare of tourists themselves. Under partial specialization, nT < nˆT ,
non-tradable and land prices grow less steeply with nT . The negative real income effect
stemming from the tourist inflow is less hard, and it is more likely to be overwhelmed by
the benefits from expanding product variety. This explains why εˆF < εˆP . In the remainder
of the paper, we say that consumption amenities are strong when ε < εˆP (strongly differ-
entiated services sector), and that consumption amenities are weak when ε ≥ εˆP (poorly
differentiated services sector).
It follows that, when ε < εˆF , tourists benefit from more tourism in all scenarios; when
ε > εˆP , tourists loose from more tourism in all scenarios; when εˆF > ε > εˆP , tourists benefit
from more tourism under partial specialization, but loose from more tourism when the city
is fully specialized.
As a final comment, we underscore the role of nominal income for the results of this
section. When nominal income is fixed as with tourists, tourism may increase or decrease
welfare, depending on the strength of consumption amenities. In contrast, when the nominal
income is free to adjust as with residents, either through wages or land prices, tourism always
increases welfare. Under partial specialization, the wage is fixed and only the land price
responds to tourism. Therefore, Proposition 2 crucially depends on the assumption that
all residents have equal land endowments. In the next section, we show how the picture
changes when land is unequally distributed among residents.
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4 Welfare effects of tourism with unequal land endow-
ments
Proposition 2 delivers the sharp result that residents always benefit from tourism, under
the assumption that land is equally distributed across residents. In this section we show
that a more complex picture emerges if we take into account the fact that land is unequally
distributed among residents. In particular, in a context of partial specialization in services
and where residents have unequal land endowments, we show that: (i) tourism always
increases welfare inequality; (ii) tourism causes welfare losses among some residents, unless
consumption amenities are strong enough. The results of the previous section still hold for
the representative resident and, consequently, they are valid at the aggregate level.
Suppose, then, that land is unequally distributed across residents. Each resident i is
endowed with an amount of land Hi, with the only restriction that
∑nR
i=1Hi = H . Individual
income is then IRi = w + qHi, where Hi may well be zero for a group of residents (call
them workers) whose only source of income is the wage. Define real income of residents
as I˜Ri =
IRi
pγs q1−γ
, and welfare is VRi = m
γ(1−ε)
ε I˜Ri. Our measure of welfare inequality among
any two individuals is the ratio of their indirect utilities; then, welfare inequality perfectly
matches real income inequality, as m is the same for all residents and vanishes by taking
the ratio:
VRi′
VRi
=
I˜Ri′
I˜Ri
.
Thus, tourism affects welfare inequality only through real incomes. Because of homoth-
etic preferences, all aggregate variables, such as prices and factor allocations, only depend
on the total amount of land in the city, H . This implies that the equilibrium we derived
in the previous sections holds (in aggregate terms) independently of the land distribution
across residents.
Let us start from the partial specialization scenario, when nT < nˆT and the city produces
both services and the intermediate input. We present our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When the city is partially specialized, nT < n̂T , (i) tourism increases
welfare inequality among residents; (ii) when consumption amenities are weak, ε > ε̂P ,
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tourism induces welfare losses for those residents whose share of land endowment, Hi/H,
falls below a cutoff ĥ, with ĥ > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition makes essentially two points. When the wage is fixed to ak as with
partial specialization, wealthier residents obtain a larger share of their income from their
land endowment; in this case tourism, which increases land rents, brings a larger relative
benefit to wealthier residents, thus raising welfare inequality.
The second result is that, for some residents, the welfare effect could even be negative.
In particular, this is the case when
Hi
H
<
ε− γ + βsγε
1− γ + βsγε
ak
aknR + nT IT
≡ ĥ.
When consumption amenities are weak (ε > ε̂P ) this threshold is positive. The implication
is that poorer residents, whose land endowment falls below ĥ (and in particular workers,
whose land endowment is nil), lose from tourism. On the contrary, when consumption
amenities are strong, the love of variety effect more than compensates the negative effect
on real incomes, and all residents gain from tourism.13
Note that our analysis holds given any land distribution; however, the actual number
of residents who fall below or above the threshold depends on the exact shape of the land
distribution function at the city level. As an illustration, consider our baseline case of equal
land endowments, Hi =
H
nR
: then, it is easy to see that all residents fall above the threshold
and gain from tourism. As a second example, suppose that land is equally distributed
among nHR ≡ nR−n
w
R land-owners, where n
w
R is a given number of workers; that is, residents
with zero land endowment. Then, according to our analysis, nwR residents lose from tourism,
whereas the aggregate gain is shared among the nHR land-owners.
Let us add some interesting remarks about the threshold ĥ. First, the threshold ĥ is
smaller when labor productivity in the tradable sector, ak, is low, and when the resident
13Notice that ε̂P is the same threshold that regulates when tourists are hurt or not by tourism. With
partial specialization of the city (nT < n̂T ) both workers and tourists earn a fixed income, so their welfare
will be increasing in nT only if the non-tradable sector is highly differentiated.
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population, nR, is large. Then, given two cities with the same distribution of land among
residents and the same number of tourists, nT , our model predicts that a marginal increase
in tourism will benefit a larger share of residents in the less productive and bigger city.
Second, ĥ itself is a decreasing function of nT , with the implication that for some residents
the effect of tourism on welfare is non-monotone. Given a certain initial value for nT , think
of a resident whose land endowment is slightly below the cutoff. An increase in nT initially
reduces his welfare. But as the number of tourists grows (thus reducing the threshold ĥ) he
may end up in a situation where his endowment is above the cutoff, with the welfare effect
of nT being now positive.
We stress however that the set of residents who always gain and always lose from tourism,
in a partial specialization scenario, is independent of nT . Since ĥ is decreasing in nT , a
resident i whose marginal benefit from tourism is already positive for nT = 0 will gain from
a further increase in tourism. This is the case for:
∂VR,i
∂nT
∣∣∣
nT=0
> 0 ⇐⇒
Hi
H
>
ε− γ + βsγε
1− γ + βsγε
1
nR
.
On the contrary, a resident i whose marginal benefit from tourism is negative at n̂T (the
threshold for full specialization) will lose a fortiori from tourism for all nT < n̂T . This is
the case for:
∂VR,i
∂nT
∣∣∣
nT=n̂T
< 0 ⇐⇒
Hi
H
<
ε− γ + βsγε
1− γ + βsγε
αsε
1− βsε
1
nR
.
The different possibilities are illustrated in figure 4, where we plot the indirect utility
profile for residents who always benefit from tourism (green line), those who always lose
from tourism (red line), and those with an intermediate endowment who first lose and then
benefit from tourism (blue line).
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
With the following proposition we show that when the city fully specializes in the non-
tradable sector (nT reaches n̂T ) all residents (workers included) benefit from tourism.
Proposition 5. When the city is fully specialised in the non-tradable sector, nT ≥ nˆT , (i)
tourism does not increase welfare inequality and (ii) tourism makes all residents better off.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
We know that when the city is fully specialized in the non-tradable sector both wages
and land prices are linear in the number of tourists. In this case, tourism does non affect
relative incomes.
5 Amenities and welfare in a system of two cities
In this section, we study the spatial equilibrium of tourists across alternative destinations.
The parameter AT , the level of historical amenities, is going to play a role in this section:
since AT enters tourist welfare, the mobility of tourists creates a link between local historical
amenities and the endogenous variables of the model, including consumption amenities and
the welfare of residents. Cities with a rich historical heritage will attract more tourist
demand, and therefore have higher land prices, consumption prices, and a larger and more
differentiated services sector. In a context of unequal land endowments, higher historical
amenities are also associated with higher welfare inequality and welfare losses for poorer
residents.
To keep things simple, we focus on a simple system of two cities that differ in terms of
four exogenous parameters: the level of historical amenities enjoyed by tourists, the TFP
of the tradable and non-tradable services sectors, the number of residents and the stock
of land.14 Both cities are small economies that can freely trade with each other and with
the rest of the world. This modeling approach is in the spirit of the Rosen-Roback classic
framework (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982), with the difference that, in our model, the resident
population is fixed, while there is a second class of agents, tourists, who are mobile across
cities. We still treat the total number of tourists in the urban system, NT , as exogenous.
Let φ denote the fraction of the total tourist population NT choosing city 1, nT,1 = φNT .
14The results can be easily extended to the case where cities also differ in the fixed entry cost in the
services sector.
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Tourists are freely mobile across the two destinations. Then, spatial equilibrium requires:
∆V (φ) ≡ VT,1(φ)− VT,2(φ) = 0, and 0 < φ < 1
or ∆VT (φ) ≤ 0, and φ = 0
or ∆VT (φ) ≥ 0, and φ = 1,
meaning that no tourist has an incentive to change his choice of destination. The properties
of the equilibrium with two cities depend on whether tourist welfare, VT , is increasing or
decreasing in the number of tourists who choose a certain destination. In turn, according
to Proposition 3, whether VT is increasing or decreasing in the number of tourists depends
on two things: the specialization pattern of the city in the service sector, and the strength
of the consumption amenities. To keep the exposition simple, we focus on the case where
both cities are partially specialized in non-tradables, even when all tourists go to the same
city.15 Then, we have to distinguish between two cases: weak consumption amenities and
strong consumption amenities.
5.1 Weak consumption amenities
The existence of an interior equilibrium where tourists visit both cities requires that VT,1(φ) =
VT,2(φ) for 0 < φ < 1. The interior equilibrium is unique if and only if the following condi-
tions hold:
∂∆VT (φ)
∂φ
< 0 for 0 < φ < 1, (18)
∆VT (0) > 0, (19)
∆VT (1) < 0. (20)
When the non-tradable sector supplies poorly differentiated varieties (ε ≥ ε̂P ) the effect
of consumption amenities on welfare is weak. We know that in this case tourist welfare is
decreasing in the number of tourists visiting the city. As a result, the differential ∆VT is
decreasing in φ, and condition (18) is verified. The closed-form expression of the interior
15In other terms we are assuming that NT < min[n̂T,1, n̂T,2]. In Appendix 8.5, we also provide the
analysis for the case where full specialization occurs in one or both cities.
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equilibrium is
φ =
TP1
TP1 + TP2
+
TP1ak,2nR,2 − TP2ak,1nR,1
TP1 + TP2
, (21)
where the two terms, labeled TP1 and TP2, can be interpreted as the tourist potential of
a city in terms of historical amenities, tradable and non-tradable sectors productivity, and
total land:
TP1 ≡
(
A1a
γ
s,1H
1−γ+βsγ
1
aαsγk,1
)1/δ
,
TP2 ≡
(
A2a
γ
s,2H
1−γ+βsγ
2
aαsγk,2
)1/δ
,
where δ ≡ (1 − γ + βsγ) −
γ(1−ε)
ε
> 0. The tourist potential of a city is positively related
to the level of the historical amenity, the productivity of the non-tradable sector, the land
stock, and it is inversely related to the productivity of the tradable sector (which equals the
wage rate under partial specialization). The effect of A is obvious, since it is a parameter
that enters directly into the utility function of tourists. The effect of H works through a
reduction in the price of land, see equation (16), and in the price of non-tradable services,
see equation (17). The parameter as makes a city more attractive through a reduction
in ps again. A rise in ak (and in the city’s wage rate) makes it less attractive through a
corresponding rise in q and ps.
To ensure the existence of the interior equilibrium we need to elaborate more on con-
ditions (19) and (20). Going back to the existence of the interior equilibrium, merging
conditions (19) and (20), we get the following restriction on the ratio of the tourist poten-
tial of the two cities:
1
ak,2nR,2
ak,1nR,1
+ NT IT
ak,1nR,1
<
TP1
TP2
<
ak,1nR,1
ak,2nR,2
+
NT IT
ak,2nR,2
. (22)
This condition is satisfied as far as the two cities are not too dissimilar. When it does
not hold, we get the concentration of tourists in a single city (either φ = 0 or φ = 1 in
equilibrium). We label this situation a tourist hub. These two cases - interior equilibrium
and tourist hub - are depicted in figure 5.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
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5.2 Strong consumption amenities
When the non-tradable sector supplies highly differentiated varieties (ε < ε̂P ) the effect
of the consumption amenities is strong. According to proposition 3, tourists welfare is
increasing in the number of tourists visiting a city. Then, the following property is satisfied:
∂∆VT (φ)
∂φ
> 0 for 0 < φ < 1.
Whenever it exists, the interior spatial equilibrium is not stable. The only stable equi-
libria are the corner solutions φ∗ = 0 and φ∗ = 1, where tourists cluster in one of the two
cities. A highly differentiated non-tradable sector leads to the emergence of a tourist hub,
since tourists keep flowing into one city in spite of rising prices. This situation is depicted
in figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
In order to answer which city will become the tourist attractor we need to differentiate
among different cases. First consider the case where ∆VT (0) < 0 and ∆VT (1) > 0. In order
to fulfill these two conditions the tourist potential of the two cities shall verify:
ak,1nR,1
ak,2nR,2
+
NT IT
ak,2nR,2
<
TP1
TP2
<
1
ak,2nR,2
ak,1nR,1
+ NT IT
ak,1nR,1
.
In such a case the interior equilibrium exists but is unstable. Accordingly, perturbing the
interior equilibrium leads to the clustering of tourists in either city 1 or city 2, depending
on the sign of the shock: shocks increasing the number of tourists in a city will eventually
bring all tourists there. When ∆VT (0) < 0 and ∆VT (1) < 0, tourists will always head to
city 2. Finally, when ∆VT (0) > 0 this also implies that ∆VT (1) > 0, and city 1 will be the
tourist hub.
We derive the conclusion that the emergence of a tourist hub is possible under both
strong and weak consumption amenities. An interior equilibrium where tourists visit both
cities can be stable only if consumption amenities are weak. The emergence of a tourist
hub then follows two different channels. First, it may be driven by the fact that a city is
more attractive for tourists in terms of some exogenous features, such as those entering our
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definition of tourist potential (first nature cause). Alternatively, when endogenous amenities
are strong, it may arise following a process of circular cumulative causation, where a city who
gains a little advantage in terms of tourists eventually absorbs all of them (second nature
cause). This structure is reminiscent of the agglomeration patterns of the New Economic
Geography literature (see for instance Baldwin et al., 2005).
5.3 Historical amenities, city equilibrium and welfare
We can now go back to equations (15) – (17) to obtain the endogenous variables of the
model in terms of the tourism potential of both destinations. Let us focus on city 1.
Historical amenities affect prices, sectoral specialization and welfare through their effect on
φ, whereas tradable and non-tradable sector’s productivity and the amount of land have
both an indirect effect through φ and a direct one on the endogenous variables. Under
partial specialization we find the following. The share of the labour force employed in a city
in the non-tradable sector, Ls/nR, the number of firms in the non-tradable sector, m, the
price of land, q, and the price of non-tradable goods, ps, are positively related the level of
historical amenities in a given city, A. The same results hold true under full specialization,
with the only exceptions that the share of the labour force in the service sector is obviously
fixed in the case, and historical amenities have a positive effect on wages from equation (14).
Cities with stronger historical amenities have, on one hand, higher consumption amenities
(through m) and higher land income (through q); on the other hand, through q and ps,
they have higher prices for the goods that enter the utility function, namely non-tradable
services and land.
We are now in a position to study the relationship between historical amenities and the
welfare of residents. Given that A influences the equilibrium of the model only through
φ, propositions 2 and 4 can be immediately generalized to the case where the number of
tourists visiting a city is endogenous and, in particular, it is increasing in the historical
amenities that a city exhibits.
Proposition 6. Aggregate resident welfare, VR, is higher in cities with higher historical
amenities, A. If residents are characterized by unequal land endowments, an increase in
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historical amenities increases welfare inequality among residents, and induces welfare losses
for those residents whose share of land falls below the threshold ĥ.
Note that historical amenities do not appear directly in the residents’ utility function.
In fact, all welfare effects on residents described in proposition 6 occur only through the
mobility of the tourist population and its impact on the endogenous variables.
6 Extensions
6.1 Congestion effects
In our model, tourism always improves the aggregate welfare of residents, even as the num-
ber of tourists becomes very large. The policy implication would be that cities should
attract more and more tourists with no upper bound. However, excessive tourism may
cause a number of problems such as increased commuting times, noise, congestion on public
transports, etc.16 These issues represent a form of non-market congestion. To introduce
them we develop a simple extension of our framework. Let us bring back into the model the
parameter AR, indexing local amenities for residents, such that the utility of residents is:
Ui = AR
(
CR
γ
)γ (
hR
1− γ
)1−γ
, 0 < γ < 1.
We assume that the amenity AR is subject to non-market congestion; that is, it depreciates
as the number of tourists in the city nT increases. More specifically, let AR ≡ AR(nT ) ,
with ∂AR
∂nT
< 0. Since AR doesn’t enter the maximization problem, the equilibrium allocation
is the same as before. Thus, we can write the indirect utility of residents as V˜R ≡ ARVR,
where VR is the equilibrium welfare of residents in the baseline case – see section 3. In this
case, under fairly standard assumptions on the function AR(nT ), it is possible to show that
there exists an optimal number of tourists, n∗T , that maximizes V˜R.
As an illustration, suppose that AR(nT ) = e
−ρnT ; then,
∂V˜R
∂nT
< 0 ⇐⇒ −
∂AR
∂nT
nT
AR
>
∂VR
∂nT
nT
VR
16For a review of these issues, see Garcia-Hernandez et al. (2017) or McKinsey (2017).
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and we get the condition
ρ >
∂VR
∂nT
1
VR
. (23)
We are comparing two elasticities with respect to the number of tourists: the elasticity
of non-market congestion and the combined elasticity of love of variety and real income
effects, as summarized by VR. Now, note that, in our model, the right-hand side of (23)
is monotonically decreasing in nT , both under partial and full specialization. Then, for
low levels of tourism (nT < n
∗
T ) the combination of increasing real incomes and increas-
ing consumption amenities prevail over non-market congestion forces;17 for high levels of
tourism (nT > n
∗
T ), the opposite is true. Consequently, with congestion effects the welfare
of residents is hump-shaped in the number of tourists, with a bliss point at n∗T .
6.2 Different goods for residents and tourists
So far we have assumed that residents and tourists consume the same goods. However, it can
be argued that the consumption basket of residents and tourists is actually quite different.
Let us examine this issue in the polar case where residents and tourists consume two disjoint
sets of differentiated varieties. For simplicity, we return to the baseline case where land is
equally distributed among residents. There is a sector r, that supplies differentiated varieties
to residents, and a sector t, that supplies differentiated varieties to tourists (lower-case
subscripts indicate the firm side, whilst upper-case letters indicate the consumer side). The
CES bundle for residents is CR =
(∫ m
0
cεRjdj
) 1
ε , whereas for tourists it is: CT =
(∫ m
0
cεT jdj
) 1
ε .
We assume that the technology is the same in both sectors, and that labour is perfectly
mobile, so that the wage is equalized. Then, since the marginal cost and the mark-up are
the same, firms in the two sectors also charge the same price: psr = pst = ps.
Under these assumptions, it is possible to show that, in aggregate terms, the model has
the same equilibrium as in the baseline case, with Ls = Lsr + Lst and m = mr + mt (all
17We require that ρ is not too large, so that the condition holds for nT → 0 - in this way, we avoid the
trivial case where welfare is decreasing from the outset.
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derivations are shown in the Appendix). Then, we obtain:
mr =
1− ε
1− βsε
(1 + κPq )aknR + κ
P
q nT IT
(1 + κPq )η
,
mt =
1− ε
1− βsε
nT IT
(1 + κPq )η
.
These expressions allow us to make a number of interesting points. First, tourism in-
creases the relative size of the tourist sector, as the ratio mt/mr is increasing in the number
of tourists. Second, the ratio mt/mr tends to a finite number (1/κ
P
q ) for nT → ∞; there-
fore, although the city eventually becomes fully specialized in non-tradable services, it never
fully specializes in tourist services. Finally, both mr and mt are increasing in the number of
tourists; therefore, even when residents and tourists consume different goods, tourism still
increases consumption amenities for residents. The reason is that tourism makes residents
richer via increased land income, and therefore raises their aggregate consumption demand.
What are the implications for welfare? Although the effect on consumption amenities is
milder for residents, the welfare impact of tourism is always positive for them. In fact, as we
argued in the discussion of proposition 2, the mere increase in land prices is enough to make
residents better off (on average). Conversely, since the effect of consumption amenities is
stronger for tourists, the impact of tourism on their own welfare becomes more favorable.
Specifically, when the love of variety effect is strong ε < ε, the welfare effect is always
positive, like in the baseline case; however, even when the love of variety effect is weak
ε ≥ ε, tourism may have a positive effect on the welfare of tourists. This happens when:
nT IT <
γ(1− ε)
ε− γ(1− βsε)
aknR,
that is, when the number of tourists is low relative to the number of residents.
6.3 High substitutability between labor and intermediate inputs
In this section, we develop a simple extension of the production function in the services
sector, such that the elasticity of substitution between labor and the intermediate input can
be greater than one. Under partial specialization, this mechanism implies that it takes a
larger number of tourists for cities to reach full specialization. Under full specialization, it
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flattens the slope of wages with respect to tourism, as firms have more leverage to substitute
away labor for the intermediate input. These results reinforce our conclusion that the partial
specialization scenario is the most relevant to analyze: beforehand we made this point on
empirical grounds, given that full specialization is hard to observe in the real worlds - we
now add a theoretical argument.
In practice, we assume that labor and the intermediate input are combined according to
a CES structure, with elasticity of substitution θ ≥ 1; this structure is then nested into a
Cobb-Douglas production function that includes land. Therefore, all the results that follow
subsume our baseline results as a special case in which θ = 1.
Formally, let the production function for the non-tradable good be:
ys = ash
βs
s
[
(αs)
1
θ l
θ−1
θ
s + (1− αs − βs)
1
θ y
θ−1
θ
k
] θ
θ−1
(1−βs)
, θ ≥ 1,
while the production function for the intermediate good is the same as in the baseline
case. This formulation nests the baseline Cobb-Douglas case for θ = 1. Also, note that we
have already dropped the subscript j, given that all firms are symmetric. Combining the
first-order conditions for ls and yk, and summing over all firms we obtain:
wLs =
αs
(1− αs − βs)
w1−θYk.
Using the market clearing condition for the intermediate good and for labor, and repeating
the same steps as in section 3.3, we can write:
wLs =
αsw
1−θ
αsw1−θ + (1− αs − βs)
(wnR + nT IT −mη).
Finally, using the zero profit condition, we get:
wLs =
ε(1− βs)
1− βsε
Θ(w)(wnR + nT IT ). (24)
where we define Θ(w) = αsw
1−θ
αsw1−θ+(1−αs−βs)
. This expression is a generalization of equation
(13). In the case of partial specialization, where the wage is pinned down in the intermediate
sector (w = ak), the share of residents employed in services still increases linearly with the
number of tourists. However, given that Θ(w) < 1, the slope of Ls
nR
with respect to nT
is now flatter. As a result, the threshold nˆT is also larger than in the baseline case. In
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particular, it is possible to show that nˆT is increasing in θ, and tends to infinity as θ →∞.
Thus, the scope of partial specialization increases the more substitutable are labor and the
intermediate input.
Suppose, however, that the city reaches full specialization. In this case, Ls = nR, and
(24) can be written as:
w =
(1− βs)εΘ(w)
1− βsε− (1− βs)εΘ(w)
nT IT
nR
,
Using the implicit function theorem, and after some calculations, it is possible to show that:[
1−
ε(1− βs)(1− βsε)
[1− βsε− (1− βs)εΘ(w)]2
∂Θ(w)
∂w
]
dw = Θ(w)dnT .
Given that ∂Θ(w)
∂w
< 0 it is easy to check that the elasticity of wages with respect to tourism
dw
dnT
nT
w
is always lower than 1 (in contrast with the baseline case) and decreasing in θ. Finally,
since limθ→∞
∂Θ(w)
∂w
= −∞, it follows that limθ→∞
dw
dnT
nT
w
= 0: the elasticity of the wage rate
with respect to the number of tourism goes to zero for θ →∞.
In conclusion, in our baseline model, tourism leads cities to specialize in the services
sector, and, after full specialization, wages rise linearly with the number of tourists. In
a world where labor and intermediate inputs are highly substitutable, these results are
substantially weakened, while the importance of partial specialization is reinforced.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the number of firms and employment in non-tradable
service industries that are related to consumption amenities react to the inflow of tourists
at the city level in Italy. We then set up a general equilibrium model of small open cities
that are a tourist destination to study the impact of tourism on endogenous amenities, fac-
tors’ allocations across sectors, prices, and welfare. The model yields predictions consistent
with the observed pattern in the data about the relationship between tourism, amenities
and factors’ allocations, and it brings new normative implications concerning tourism and
residents’ welfare.
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An interesting message of our paper is that tourism may create winners and losers in the
resident population, and may increase inequality. The mechanism goes through an unequal
distribution of land across residents. In what we call the partial specialization scenario,
residents endowed with little land suffer from the increase in prices that tourism brings
about.
This paper contributes to the literature about the emergence and the role of urban
consumption amenities, and to the literature about the economic consequences of tourism,
which is a fast-growing sector all over the world. An interesting direction for future research
would be to widen the empirical analysis, by examining the reaction of prices to tourism, and
by thoroughly investigating the causal link between tourism and the endogenous variables
of our model.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Description of the main variables used in the empirical anal-
ysis
Tourism. Our data provide the total number of overnight stays in tourist accommodation
establishments at the province level and the total number of beds in tourist accommodation
establishments at the municipality level - a measure of capacity. We compute the share of
beds in each municipality over its province total; then, we allocate overnight stays to each
municipality based on this capacity weight. Finally, we divide the number of overnight stays
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by 365: in this way, we construct a “resident-equivalent” measure of the number of tourists.
Source: Annual Survey of Capacity of Tourist Accommodation Establishments (Istat), years
2001 and 2011.
Resident population. The resident population is taken from Census, and it is ex-
pressed in thousands of units. Source: Population Census (Istat), years 2001 and 2011.
Establishments. Hotels per 1000 residents is the total number of local units in the
tourist accommodation sector (therefore, it includes hostels, campings, etc.) divided by
the resident population expressed in thousands. Restaurants and bars per 1000 residents
is the total number of local units in the restaurants and food services sector (therefore, it
includes hostels, campings, etc.) divided by the resident population expressed in thousands.
Retail shops per 1000 residents is the total number of local units in the retail shop sector
(therefore, it includes hostels, campings, etc.) divided by the resident population expressed
in thousands. Source: Industry and Services Census (Istat), years 2001 and 2011.
Labor force. The share of labor force in the retail services sector is the sum of the
number of workers employed in the tourist accommodation sector, in the restaurant and
food services sector, and in the retail shop sector, divided by the total number of workers
employed in the municipality. Source: Industry and Services Census (Istat), years 2001 and
2011.
8.2 Exact values of the constants
In this section we report the exact value of all the constants used in the paper.
κs = α
αs
s β
βs
s (1− αs − βs)
(1−αs−βs), κFw =
αsε
1− (αs + βs)ε
κPm =
1− ε
1− βsε
, κFm =
1− ε
1− (αs + βs)ε
κPq =
1− γ + βsεγ
γ(1− βsε)
, κFq =
1− γ + βsεγ
γ[1− (αs + βs)ε]
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8.3 Analytical derivation of the equilibrium
8.3.1 Optimal price ps
Rewrite the first order conditions in the non-tradable sector (5) as:
lsj =
αs
1−αs−βs
yk
w
,
hsj =
βs
1−αs−βs
yk
q
,
psj =
1
ε(1−αs−βs)
yα+β
kj
asl
αs
s h
βs
s
,
(25)
where we have divided the first and the second condition by the third, and rearranged the
third in terms of psj. Now plug the first and the second equation into the third of (25) to
obtain ps =
wαsqβs
εκsas
.
8.3.2 Current account balance equation
As a preliminary step, not that total consumer expenditure can be expressed as nRIR,
because the wage is equalized in the two sectors and the labor market clears - equation (10).
With this in mind, plug the first order conditions for consumers (1) into the market clearing
conditions for the non-tradable (8) and the land (9) markets.
γwnR + γqH + γnT IT = mpsys
(1− γ)wnR + (1− γ)qH + (1− γ)nT IT + qmhS = qH
Then, use the zero profit condition in the first equation (psys = wls + qhs + yk + η), and
sum the two equations to get:
wnR + qH + nT IT + qmhS = wmls + qmhs +myk +mη + qH,
where we expressed the firm variables on the right-hand side in aggregate terms. Note that
the qHs and the qH terms cancel out. Now, plug into this expression the market clearing
condition for the intermediate input (11):
wnR + nT IT = wmls + Y
o
k +X.
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Finally, plug in the zero profit condition in the Y ok = wLk and note that w(mls+LK) cancels
out with wnR on the left-hand side by labour market clearing. We are left with:
nT IT = X.
8.4 Proofs of propositions
8.4.1 Proof of proposition 2
Substitute the wage rate (14), the land price (16), and the price of non-tradable services
(17) into the expression for VR given by equation (2). For nT < nˆT , we obtain:
VR =
K
nR
(1 + κPq )aknR + κ
P
q nT IT
(aknR + nT IT )1−γ+βsγ −
γ(1−ε)
ε
where K ≡ (κ
P
m
η
)
γ(1−ε)
ε
(εκs)γ
(κPq )
1−γ+βsγ
aγsH
1−γ+βsγ
aαsγ
k
. The numerator of this expression derives from
the nominal income of residents as a function of tourists, whereas the denominator combines
the land price component (1 − γ + βsγ) and the love of variety component (
γ(1−ε)
ε
). Note
that land price has a direct effect on the price level (1 − γ) and an indirect effect, since it
is part of the marginal cost for firms in the services sector (βsγ). Take the derivative with
respect to nT :
∂VR
∂nT
=
KIT
nR(aknR + nT IT )
2−γ+βsγ−
γ(1−ε)
ε
×{
κPq (aknR + nT IT )−
[
1− γ + βsγ −
γ(1− ε)
ε
]
[(1 + κPq )aknR + κ
P
q nT IT ]
}
.
Collect terms:
∂VR
∂nT
=
KIT
nR(aknR + nT IT )
2−γ+βsγ−
γ(1−ε)
ε
×{(
γ(1− βs) +
γ(1− ε)
ε
)
κPq nT IT +
[
κPq −
(
1− γ + βsγ −
γ(1− ε)
ε
)
(1 + κPq )
]
aknR
}
.
Now plug in the expression for κPq and do the remaining simplifications:
∂VR
∂nT
=
KIT
nR(aknR + nT IT )2−γ+βsγ −
γ(1−ε)
ε
{
1− γ + βsγε
ε
nT IT +
(1− ε)
ε
aknR
}
,
which is always positive.
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Under full specialization, nT ≥ nˆT , the welfare of residents is:
VR =
(
κFm
η
)γ(1−ε)
ε
·
(κFw + κ
F
q )(εκsas)
γ
(κFw)
γαs(κFq )
1−γ+βsγ
H1−γ+βsγ
n1−αsγR
(nT IT )
γ(1−αs−βs)+
γ(1−ε)
ε ,
which is clearly increasing in nT .
8.4.2 Proof of proposition 3
Substitute the equilibrium expressions for the number of firms (15), the land price (16), and
the price of non-tradables (17) into the indirect utility of tourists (3). For nT < nˆT , we get:
VT = KAT IT (aknR + nT IT )
γ(1−ε)
ε
−(1−γ+βsγ),
where K is a constant term, as defined above. The partial derivative with respect to the
number of tourists can be written as:
∂VT
∂nT
=
[
γ(1− ε)
ε
− (1− γ + βsγ)
]
VT
aknR + nT IT
.
This expression is greater than zero for ε < γ
1+βsγ
. This proves the proposition under the
case of partial specialization.
For nT ≥ nˆT , we get:
VT =
(εκs)
γ(κFm)
γ(1−ε)
ε
(κFw)
αsγ(κFq )
1−γ+βsγ
Aaγsn
αsγ
R H
1−γ+βsγIT
η
γ(1−ε)
ε
(nT IT )
γ(1−ε)
ε
−[1−γ(1−αs−βs)],
whose partial derivative with respect to the number of tourists can be written as:
∂VT
∂nT
=
[
γ(1− ε)
ε
− 1 + γ(1− αs − βs)
]
VT
nT
.
This expression is greater than zero for: ε < γ
1+γ(αs+βs)
. This proves the proposition under
the case of full specialization.
8.4.3 Proof of proposition 4
When nT < nˆT , real income for resident i is:
I˜Ri =
(εκsas)
γ
(κPq )
1−γ+βsγ
H1−γ+βsγ
aαsγk
ak + κ
P
q (aknR + nT IT )
Hi
H
(aknR + nT IT )1−γ+βsγ
.
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To prove the first part of the proposition, write the real income ratio as:
I˜Ri′
I˜Ri
=
aK + κ
P
q (aKnR + nT IT )
Hi′
H
aK + κPq (aKnR + nT IT )
Hi
H
,
which is increasing in nT for Hi′ > Hi.
Let us turn to the second part of the proposition. Welfare for resident i is:
VRi = K
ak + κ
P
q (aknR + nT IT )
Hi
H
(aknR + nT IT )
1−γ+βsγ−
γ(1−ε)
ε
,
where K is a constant term, as defined above. Taking the derivative with respect to nT :
∂VRi
∂nT
=
KIT
(aknR + nT IT )
1+ ε−γ+βsγε
ε
{
κPq
Hi
H
(aknR + nT IT )−
ε− γ + βsγε
ε
[
ak + κ
P
q (aknR + nT IT )
Hi
H
]}
.
In the curly brackets, collect the Hi
H
terms:
∂VRi
∂nT
=
KIT
(aknR + nT IT )
1+ ε−γ+βsγε
ε
[
γ(1− βsε)
ε
κPq (aknR + nT IT )
Hi
H
−
ε− γ + βsγε
ε
ak
]
.
The derivative is positive whenever the term in curly brackets is positive; that is, for
Hi
H
>
ε− γ + βsγε
1− γ + βsγε
ak
aknR + nT IT
,
where we have already substituted the expression for κPq .
8.4.4 Proof of proposition 5
When nT ≥ nˆT , real income for resident i is:
I˜Ri =
(εκsas)
γ
(κFw)
γαs(κFq )
1−γ+βsγ
nαsγR H
1−γ+βsγ
(
κFw
nR
+
κFq Hi
H
)
(nT IT )
γ(1−αs−βs).
It is easy to see that this expression is increasing in nT for all Hi, which proves the second
part of the proposition. The real income ratio for any two pair of residents {i, i′}, is:
I˜Ri′
I˜Ri
=
 κFwnR + κFq Hi′H
κFw
nR
+
κFq Hi
H
 ,
which is independent of the number of tourists. This proves the first part of the proposition.
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8.5 Spatial equilibrium with full specialization
When ε < ε̂P and ε̂F > ε, the properties of the spatial equilibrium derived in section 5 still
hold. In fact, when ε < ε̂P , tourist welfare is monotonically decreasing in the number of
tourists, be the city fully or partially specialized. Therefore, provided an interior equilibrium
exists, it will be unique, and still given by VT,1(φ) = VT,2(φ). If either one or both cities
specialize in the services sector, tourist welfare takes a different expression and, as a result,
the expression for the equilibrium φ will differ from the (see 21).
Similarly, when ε̂F > ε, tourist welfare is monotonically increasing in the number of
tourists under both scenarios. Therefore, if an interior equilibrium exists, it is unstable,
and the only stable equilibria entail full concentration of tourists in one of the two cities.
Suppose a tourist hub emerges in city 1, with NT > n̂T,1. Then, city 1 fully specializes in
the services sector, whereas city 2, with no tourists, remains partially specialized.
Case where ε̂F < ε < ε̂P (moderate consumption amenity)
A more complicated case arises when ε̂F < ε < ε̂P . In this case, tourist welfare is non-
monotonic in the number of tourists: it increases with nT under partial specialization and
decreases with nT under full specialization.
First, suppose that NT < min[n̂T,1, n̂T,2]; in this case, full specialization never occurs,
even if all tourists go to the same city. With partial specialization and ε < ε̂P , this implies
that the (stable) spatial equilibrium features the emergence of a tourist hub in one of the
two cities, like in the case of highly differentiated product varieties.
Second, note that, for NT large enough, the functions VT,1 and VT,2 only cross once in
the downward-sloping part of the curve. Therefore there is a unique interior equilibrium
that is also stable, like in the case of poorly differentiated varieties.
When NT is in the intermediate range, given that the welfare functions are not mono-
tonic, there can be multiple crossings. Unfortunately, the number of crossings, as well as the
range itself, depend on the shape of the functions. In general, an interior stable equilibrium
may coexist with tourist-hub equilibria in either one or both cities.
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8.6 Different goods for residents and tourists: analytical deriva-
tions
First, we show that the total number of firms in the city, mr +mT is still given by equation
(15). The market clearing condition for the intermediate good is
mrykr +mtykt + (mr +mt)η = Y
o
k +X.
Using the first-order conditions from the firm’s problem, we can rewrite the same condition
in terms of labour
1− α− β
α
wLsr +
1− α− β
α
wLtr + (mr +mt)η = wLk +X.
Also note that the current account balance condition X = nT IT still holds. Plugging this
expression into the labour market clearing condition, LSr + LSt + Lk = nR, we obtain:
w(Lsr + Lst) =
αs
1− βs
(aknR + nT )− (mr +mt)η.
Finally, we need a condition to express the labour force in the resident and in the tourist
non-tradable sector as a function of the number of firms. Since firms in both sectors make
zero profits, we have: wLsr =
αε
1−ε
mrη and wLst =
αε
1−ε
mtη, given optimal firm behavior.
Doing the final substitution, we get:
mr +mt =
1− ε
1− βsε
wnR + nT IT
η
,
which is the analogous of equation (15), and:
w(Lsr + Lst) =
αsε
1− βsε
wnR + nT IT
η
,
which is the analogous of equation (13). These expressions imply that, in aggregate terms,
the model has the same equilibrium as in the baseline case, with Ls = Lsr + Lst and
m = mr +mt. We need only to calculate the factor allocation between the resident and the
tourist non-tradable sectors. Let us turn to the demand side of the economy. In the resident
sector, given that firms are symmetrical and prices are equalized between the resident and
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the tourist sector, we have
nRcR =
γnRIR
mrps
= ysr,
nT cT =
γnT IT
mtps
= yst
where, in each expression, the first equality comes from the consumer’s problem and the
second equality is the market clearing condition. Then, since the size of the individual firm
is the same in both sectors, it follows that mt
mr
= nT IT
nRIR
. As a last step, using the expression
for mr +mt, we obtain:
mr =
1− ε
1− βsε
(1 + κPq )aknR + κ
P
q nT IT
(1 + κPq )η
,
mt =
1− ε
1− βsε
nT IT
(1 + κPq )η
.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean S.D. Min 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Max
Residents (1000) 7873 7.19 39.88 0.03 1.07 2.40 5.79 2546.80
Tourists per 1000 residents 7873 18.93 61.03 0.00 0.00 1.45 8.43 1471.81
Hotels, etc. per 1000 residents 7873 1.23 3.73 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.80 74.26
Restaurants and bars per 1000 residents 7873 4.45 3.65 0.00 2.61 3.57 5.09 79.21
Retail stores per 1000 residents 7873 9.87 5.12 0.00 6.63 9.27 12.28 97.97
Employment in hotels, etc. per 1000 residents 7873 3.79 10.98 0.00 0.00 0.35 2.67 257.09
Employment in restaurants and bars per 1000 residents 7873 10.36 10.17 0.00 4.90 7.87 12.56 196.60
Employment in retail stores per 1000 residents 7873 19.00 18.43 0.00 10.83 15.87 22.44 744.41
Land area (squared km) 7873 37.19 50.21 0.15 11.25 21.77 42.96 1307.71
∆ tourists per 1000 residents 7873 1.74 13.71 -87.77 0.00 0.57 3.15 89.27
∆ hotels per 1000 residents 7873 0.04 2.06 -39.04 -0.03 0.00 0.23 71.43
∆ restaurants and bars per 1000 residents 7873 0.86 2.36 -26.32 -0.03 0.75 1.59 55.18
∆ retail stores per 1000 residents 7873 -1.55 2.72 -29.41 -2.82 -1.54 -0.25 83.22
∆ employment in hotels, etc. per 1000 residents 7873 0.54 12.45 -182.84 -0.40 0.00 0.50 349.88
∆ employment in restaurants and bars per 1000 residents 7873 4.56 10.12 -147.62 0.78 3.63 6.84 223.78
∆ employment in retail stores per 1000 residents 7873 0.28 12.10 -134.42 -3.45 -0.38 2.69 474.48
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. The first set of variables shown are computed with
respect to the year 2001. Residents (1000) is the number of residents at the city level expressed in thousands. Tourists per 1000 residents is
the number of tourists normalized by the resident population expressed in thousands. We then report statistics for the total number of es-
tablishments and total employment normalized by thousands of residents at the municipality level for some NACE Rev. 2 industries: Hotels,
etc. is industry 55, Restaurants and bars is industry 56, Retail stores is the sum of 3-digit industries 471, 472, 475, 476, 477. Land area is
total urban land area. In the bottom part of the table, we report the change between 2001 and 2011 for the same set of variables.
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Table 2: Tourism and number of establishments
Restaurant and bars Retail trade Accommodation
All Non-spec. stores Food, beverages Household equip. Books, sport, toys Clothing, footwear
NACE Rev. 2 56 471 472 475 476 477 55
Panel A: All municipalities
∆ tourism 0.018*** 0.013*** -0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.003** 0.008*** 0.038***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
R2 0.057 0.051 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.048 0.053 0.216
Obs. 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873
Panel B: Without top decile of 2001 tourist density municipalities
∆ tourism 0.025*** 0.017*** -0.004 0.005** 0.001 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.046***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006)
R2 0.049 0.053 0.038 0.035 0.038 0.021 0.048 0.169
Obs. 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216
Panel C: Without municipalities with zero tourist density in either 2001 or 2011
∆ tourism 0.018*** 0.012*** -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003* 0.007*** 0.037***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
R2 0.072 0.077 0.040 0.041 0.049 0.071 0.079 0.226
Obs. 4,951 4,951 4,951 4,951 4,951 4,951 4,951 4,951
Notes: In all columns, the dependent variable is the change in the number of establishments per 1000 residents between 2001 and 2011. Each column represents a
different industry. In panel A we use the full sample of municipalities; in panel B we exclude the municipalities in the top decile of the tourists per 1000 residents dis-
tribution in 2001; in panel C we exclude municipalities with zero tourist density in either 2001 or 2011. All regressions include as controls total municipal land area,
average elevation, a dummy variable for coastal towns, and dummy variables for each province. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Tourism and employment
Restaurant and bars Retail trade Accommodation
All Non-spec. stores Food, beverages Household equip. Books, sport, toys Clothing, footwear
NACE Rev. 2 56 471 472 475 476 477 55
Panel A: All municipalities
∆ tourism 0.048*** 0.026*** 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.007** 0.016*** 0.117***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.029)
R2 0.088 0.023 0.013 0.033 0.017 0.036 0.017 0.121
Obs. 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873 7,873
Panel B: Without top decile of 2001 tourist density municipalities
∆ tourism 0.063*** 0.015 -0.011 0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.024** 0.110***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.016)
R2 0.038 0.022 0.015 0.034 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.064
Obs. 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216 7,216
Panel C: Without municipalities with zero tourist density in either 2001 or 2011
∆ tourism 0.041** 0.023*** 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.006* 0.011** 0.117***
(0.018) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.032)
R2 0.112 0.046 0.023 0.044 0.028 0.057 0.033 0.149
Obs. 4,952 4,952 4,952 4,952 4,952 4,952 4,952 4,952
Notes: In all columns, the dependent variable is the change in employment per 1000 residents between 2001 and 2011. Each column represents a different industry. In
panel A we use the full sample of municipalities; in panel B we exclude the municipalities in the top decile of the tourists per 1000 residents distribution in 2001; in
panel C we exclude municipalities with zero tourist density in either 2001 or 2011. All regressions include as controls total municipal land area, average elevation, a
dummy variable for coastal towns, and dummy variables for each province. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis.
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Figure 1: The figure plots the empirical density function of the change in the number of
tourists (in terms of resident-equivalent) per 1000 residents over the period 2001 – 2011,
after having dropped municipalities at the top 1% and bottom 1% of the distribution.
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Figure 2: The figure plots the average change in the number of tourists (in terms of resident-
equivalent) per 1000 residents over the period 2001 – 2011. Municipalities are ranked in
terms of deciles of the distribution of the number of tourists per residents in 2001.
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Figure 3: Endogenous variables at the baseline equilibrium
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Figure 4: Inequal welfare effects of tourism according to the residents’ land endowments
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Figure 5: The spatial equilibrium with weak consumption amenities
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Figure 6: The spatial equilibrium with strong consumption amenities
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